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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HOWARD W. BRANDT and LEONA
J. BRANDT, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

Case No.

SPRINGVILLE B A N K I N G COMPANY, a Utah corporation, F. C.
PACKARD and HOWARD C. MAYCOCK,
Defendants and Respondents.

9128

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY

STATEMEI~T

As in Appellants' brief, the parties will be referred to
as in the Court below.
Plaintiffs have appealed from a Summary Judgment
granted to Defendants by the Honorable Maurice Harding,
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District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court pursuant to a Memorandum Decision dated the 16th day of
July, 1959.
This is the second lawsuit commenced by the Plaintiffs
In an effort to obtain a judgment based upon the facts
involved herein (R. 41).
The Statement of Facts presented by Plaintiffs in their
brief is misleading in many respects, inconsistent with
the record herein and while some of the facts and inuendos
must be deemed admitted for purposes of this appeal they
are vigorously denied by the Defendants. The attention of
this Court is directed to the record filed herein and particularly the pleadings, for a correct statement of the facts
involved on this appeal.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on February 24, 1959
which purports to allege a cause of action for fraud against
Defendants for their alleged failure to disclose the existence
of a chattel mortgage in connection with a transaction in
which Plaintiffs were involved (R. 3). This transaction
referred to took place in February and March of 1955.
Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim in which
they set forth as a defense, among others, the Statute of
Limitations (R. 9). Plaintiffs thereafter amended their
complaint to allege that the existence of the alleged fraud
was not discovered by them until 1958 (R. 21).
Defendants then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
based upon two grounds: ( 1) that the cause of action alleged by Plaintiffs was barred by the Statute of Limitations because Plaintiffs had constructive notice of the
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chattel mortgage by virtue of the filing of said chattel
mortgage with the County Recorder; and (2) that as a
matter of law, under all of the facts shown by the pleadings
and by Plaintiffs own allegations the damages alleged by
the Plaintiffs were not proximately caused by the alleged
concealment by the Defendants, since the chattel mortgage
did not cause any dama.ge or loss to them (R. 27). This
motion was based upon an affidavit by one of the defendants which remains uncontroverted despite a lengthy and
rambling affidavit prepared by Plaintiffs' attorney (R.
29). The latter affidavit is filled with allegations, conclusions of law and inuendos which although denied by the
Defendants still does not alter the facts upon which Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal certain of Plaintiffs' allegations of facts must be assumed to be correct even though
they are denied by Defendants.
During the early part of 1955, Plaintiffs started to
negotiate with Waldo W. Jackson, brother of Leona J .
Brandt, one of the Plaintiffs and brother-in-law of Howard
J. Brandt, the other Plaintiff. Plaintiffs discussed with
Mr. Jackson a proposal by which they would invest money
in a new hardware and farm implement business to be
organized by them. These negotiations were in no way initiated by the Defendant bank or its officers. The new
corporation organized by Plaintiffs. and Mr. Jackson was
known as Stockman & Farmers Mart. This corporation was
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to acquire part of the hardware and farm implement inventory and certain equipment owned by Jackson Sales &
Service Company, a corporation controlled by Mr. Jackson.
The Defendant bank and its officers assisted Plaintiffs in borrowing the $10,000.00 which they were to invest
in the new corporation. On March 2, 1955 the transaction
was closed in the Defendant bank and Plaintiffs and their
brother (or brother-in-law) deposited checks representing
their investment to the account of the new corporation and
a check was drawn by the new corporation to Jackson Sales
& Service Company to pay for the inventory and equipment
being transferred. The Defendant bank also loaned the
new corporation some money upon the personal guarantee
of the Plaintiffs.
On the date of the above transaction the Defendant,
Springville Banking Company, held a note of Jackson Sales
& Service Company, dated September 19, 1949, the unpaid
balance of which on March 2, 1955 was $40,194.79. This
note was secured by a real estate mortgage on considerable
real property owned by said corporation in Springville,
Utah and a chattel mortgage dated September 19, 1949,
covering certain personal property (R. 29). This chattel
mortgage was filed with the County Recorder of Utah
County on September 24, 1949 as Entry No. 8708. It is
alleged that this chattel mortgage covered part of the personal property transferred by Jackson Sales & Service
Company to Stockman & Farmers Mart and for purposes
of this appeal this allegation is admitted. There is no allegation in Plaintiffs' complaint and there is no factual
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basis for Plaintiffs' statement in their brief that the $10,000.00 paid by Plaintiffs to the new corporation, of which
Plaintiffs were President and Vice-President, was used
to apply on the chattel mortgage indebtedness.
It is alleged that at the time of the above transaction
in the Defendant bank in March of 1955 Defendants did
not disclose to Plaintiffs the existence of the above chattel
mortgage dated September 19, 1949.
As shown by the affidavit of defendant Howard C.
Maycock, Cashier of the Springville Banking Company, the
note secured by the real estate and chattel mortgage was
later paid and discharged by Jackson Sales & Service Company or WaldoW. Jackson (R. 29). This was done by the
conveyance to the bank of part or all of the real estate covered by the mortgage. The chattel mortgage was never
foreclosed and the property described in the chattel mortgage was never attached by the bank or in any way affected
by said chattel mortgage (R. 29). The said Stockmen &
Farmers Mart and the Plaintiffs herein did not sustain any
loss as a result of the existence of said chattel mortgage.
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery as set forth in their
Amended Complaint was based upon the allegation in Paragraph 10 "that as a proximate result of said Chattel Mortgage and the concealment thereof by Defendants, plaintiffs
lost said $10,000.00 when said business of Stockman &
Farmers Mart failed." (Emphasis added.) (R. 23.) As
stated in this allegation, Plaintiffs' damages, if any, resulted from the failure of the business, not from the existence of the chattel mortgage.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW
UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
THE ALLEGED FRAUD OR CONCEALMENT
DID NOT PROXIMATELY CAUSE PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGED DAMAGES.
A.

PLAINTIFFS ARE BOUND BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF THEIR COMPLAINT.

B.

THE ALLEGED CONCEALMENT OF THE
CHATTEL MORTGAGE WAS NOT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS'
ALLEGED DAMAGES.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, SINCE PLAINTIFFS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW
UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
THE ALLEGED FRAUD OR CONCEALMENT
DID NOT PROXIMATELY CAUSE PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGED DAMAGES.
Despite all of the allegations which Plaintiffs attempted
to set forth in their affidavit, the fact remains that the
single issue raised by Plaintiffs.' complaint is the alleged
failure of the Defendants to disclose the existence of a
chattel mortgage, executed 6 years before, that might have
affected personal property being transferred to a corporation Plaintiffs helped organize. It is. undisputed that this
chattel mortgage was incidental to a real estate mortgage
and that the note secured by said mortgage was, subsequently discharged without any loss to the Stockmen &
Farmers Mart or to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs even admit
that their loss of investment resulted from the failure of
the business.
A.

PLAINTIFFS ARE BOUND BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF THEIR COMPLAINT.

For purposes of the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment the allegations of the Amended Complaint must
be deemed admitted. Plaintiffs cannot seek to vary or alter
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the allegations of their Complaint. They cannot seek to
set forth new causes of action by affidavit.
Under Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and the undisputed facts, there is no genuine issue of fact on the question of causation.
It is clear that for purposes of a Motion for Summary
Judgment the Court must accept the allegations. of the
Complaint as true. Iverson v. United States, 63 F. Supp.
1001 (D. C. 1946) ; Downey v. Banker, 32 F. Supp. 874 (S.
D. N. Y. 1940).
The District Court was therefore justified in relying
upon Plaintiffs' own allegations in granting the Motion for
Summary Judgment.

B.

THE ALLEGED CONCEALMENT OF THE
CHATTEL MORTGAGE WAS NOT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS'
ALLEGED DAMAGES.

The alleged concealment of the chattel mortgage was
not the proximate cause of any damage to the Plaintiffs.
In order to make out a case for fraudulent misrepresentation a plaintiff must prove actual damage.
It is evidently plaintiffs' reasoning that had they
known of the existence of the mortgage they would not
have gone into this business and if they had not gone into
the business they would not have lost their money when
the business failed. This is not sufficient proximate cause.
By the same reasoning they could contend that if they were
injured while working for the business or if the building
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burned down causing them loss that the Defendants would
be responsible.
The Restatement of Torts summarizes the law on this
question. Section 549, covering the measure of damages
for fraudulent misrepresentation, states that "The measure
of damages which the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to recover from its maker as damages
under the rule stated in Section 525 is the pecuniary loss
which results from the falsity of the matter misrepresented
* * *" The comment under this Section states:
"Under the rule stated in this clause the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to
recover from its maker only the actual loss which
because of its falsity he sustains by his action or
inaction in reliance upon it."
It must then be the falsity of the matter misrepresented
that causes the loss. On page 112 of Volume 3 of the Restatement of Torts the following further statement is made :
"One who, having acquired securities, retains
them in reliance upon anothers fraudulent representation is not entitled to recover from him a loss
in value of the securities which is in no way due to
the falsity of the representation but is caused by
some other subsequent event which has, no connection with or relation thereto."
The plaintiffs in this case claim their stock in the
Stockman & Farmers Mart became worthless and they
therefore lost their investment. Under their allegations,
this may well have been the case, but the loss. did not result
from the alleged misrepresentations of the Defendants.
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A great portion of the legal argument of
brief is devoted to extensive quotations from
Torts.. In Section 90, Page 769, (1st Edition)
discusses the question of causation in a deceit

Appellants'
Prosser on
this author
action:

"Furthermore, the damage upon which a deceit
action rests must have been 'proximately caused' by
the misrepresentation. So far as the fact of causation is concerned, any loss which follows upon a
transaction into which the misstatement induces the
plaintiff to enter may be said to be caused by it;
but the same considerations which limit liability in
cases of tangible harm have operated here. In general, with only a few exceptions, the courts have
restricted recovery to those damages which might
forseeably be expected to follow from the character
of the misrepresentation. Thus, if false statements
are made in connection with the sale of corporate
stock, a subsequent decline of the market or insolvency of the corporation will not afford a basis for
recovery, unless the fact misstated was of a nature
calculated to bring about such a result. Often this
is expressed by saying that the representation is
'immaterial' in such a case; but the conclusion is
reached even though the plaintiff has relied, and
justifiably so, upon what he has been told."
The following cases also illustrate the principle that
the damages must proximately result from the fraudulent
statement or concealment; Morrell v. Wiley, 119 Conn. 578,
178 Atl. 121; Beare v. Wright, 14 N. D. 26, 103 N. W. 632;
Morgan v. Hodge, 145 Wis. 143, 129 N. W. 1083; Hindman
v. First National Bank, 112 Fed. 931 (6th Cir. 1902);
Hotling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870;
Haentz v. Loehr, 233 Wis. 583, 290 N. W. 163.
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In the AI o1·rell case, cited above, the Court said:
"* * * the damages are measured by the
difference between the actual value of the property
received and its value had it been as represented."
In the Beare case, the Court said:
"Respondent asserts that he was inveigled into
the speculation by the deceit of the appellants and,
therefore, the false repres·entations are the proximate cause of the loss he has suffered. The argument is more plausible than sound."
"The measure of damages in such cases is the
difference between the value of the property as it
actually was and its. value as it would have been if
it were such as represented to be in those particulars
in relation to which the false and fraudulent representations were made."
It is a fundamental rule that in order to maintain a
suit for fraud or deceit, some damage must be proved. In
23 American Juris prudence, Section 172, Page 985, it says:
"It is a fundamental principle of law that with
the exception of special cases recognized only in
some jurisdictions, in order to secure relief on a
basis of fraud either in law or equity, the person
seeking redress must be damaged, injured or harmed
as a result of an asserted fraud."
In Section 176, the following statement is made:
"To sustain an action for deceit, the fraud and
injury must be connected and must bear to each
other the relation of cause and effect."
In the case of Kosmos Portland Cement Co. v. D. A. Y.
Const1·uction Co., 101 F. 2d 893, 896, (7th Cir. 1939) the
following statement appears :
"It is a rule of universal application that to
constitute an actionable fraud, it must appear that
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the complaining party has been in some way damaged or prejudiced. * * * The fraud and injury must be connected and bear to the other the
relation of cause and effect; the damage must flow
from the fraud as the proximate and not the remote
cause.''
In the case of Man by v. Hibbard, 71 Colo. 296, 206 Pac.
381, the Court said :
"It is elementary that the damages recoverable
are those which result directly and proximately from
the deceit complained of."
The Plaintiffs by their complaint have alleged the
existence of fraud by concealment and they have also alleged that they sustained damages by the loss of their investment when the business venture failed. They have
failed to allege, however, and under the undisputed facts
they cannot prove that the alleged fraud was the proximate
cause of their damages. While, for purposes. of argument,
it might be said that they would not have made the investment had they known of this chattel mortgage, the fact
remains that the chattel mortgage did not cause the loss
of which they complain.
We have found no Utah case S·pecifically dealing with
the issue of causation in a deceit action but the law as
quoted above from the Restatement of Torts is unanimously
accepted. It must be the falsity of the fact misrepresented
that causes the loss to the recipient.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE STATUTE
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OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, SINCE PLAINTIFFS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
As noted, the trial court relied upon the argument and
legal reasoning set forth in Point I in granting Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. Equally valid, however, is
the first ground set forth in the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 27).
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint purports. to state a
cause of action based upon the alleged concealment of the
existence of a chattel mortgage dated September 19, 1949
given by Jackson Sales & Service Company to Defendant
Springville Banking Company. The concealment of this
fact was alleged to have taken place in March of 1955. This
lawsuit was not commenced within three years after the
date of the alleged fraud. Plaintiffs amended their original
complaint, however, to allege that the fraud was not discovered until June of 1958. The chattel mortgage involved
was filed of record in the office of the Utah County Recorder in September of 1949 and was on file at the time of
the alleged fraud.
Section 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
for a 3-year statute of limitations on "an action for relief
on the ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action
in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting
the fraud or mistake."
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Our Supreme Court has clearly held that the discovery
of the fraud does not require actual notice of the facts and
that a person is deemed to have discovered the existence of
the fraud if he has the means of obtaining the information
or has knowledge which would lead a reasonable person to
discover the facts.
In Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 Pac.
684, at page 690, the Court said:
"If a mistake occurred therefore, as alleged, he
at least had all the means in his possession of ascertaining that fact and hence must be deemed to have
known of the alleged mistake, under such circumstances our statute of limitations which was pleaded
as a defense to the cause of action in question constitutes a complete bar."
The Court then cited the case of Weight v. Bailey, 45
Utah 584, 147 Pac. 899 and stated:
"We there held that where the facts constituting
the alleged fraud or mistake are known, or where
circumstances are as in this case, that is, if facts
should have been known to the complaining party,
he cannot successfully maintain an action. * * *"
Certainly the Plaintiffs in this case had the means of
discovering the alleged fraud at the time of the transaction.
An examination of the county records 'vould have disclosed
the existence of the mortgage.
This Court has stated that where an instrument is recorded all persons are deemed to have knowledge of this
fact. In Smith v. EduJa?'·ds, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. 2d 264, 269,
involving a real estate mortgage, the Court said:
"From the time of recording these conveyances
all persons, including plaintiffs, notice was imparted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
to them that the conveyances contained the statements above quoted. That the plaintiff and all other
persons had notice that such conveyances. had been
made and recorded seems to go without saying, for
surely, if one is charged with notice of the contents,
he must be charged with notice of the existence of
the document itself."
With reference to a chattel mortgage the Supreme
Court in Bonneville Lumber Co. v. Peppard Seed Co., 72
Utah 463, 271 Pac. 226, said:
"The mortgage, as executed and ,recorded, was
unquestionably constructive notice to the defendant
and all the world of the existence of a chattel mortgage valid on its face."
Plaintiffs cite the case of Smith v. Edwards, supra, in
which the Court said "Mere constructive notice of the deed
by reason of its being filed for record is not notice of the
facts constituting the fraud." In the present case it is the
mere existence of the mortgage that is in issue, not the
existence of any fraud surrounding the execution of the
mortgage. Certainly the Court did not intend by the above
language to hold that the parties were not charged with
knowledge as to the existence of the deed.
The courts have made a distinction between this type
of case where a failure to disclose the existence of a recorded instrument is. involved and the cases where the defendant affirmatively tells the plaintiff that there are no
encumbrances. In the latter situation the courts in some
states have held that the plaintiff is excused from examining the records. In the present case, however, no conten-
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tion is made that the defendants made any oral misrepresentations or that they discouraged plaintiffs from searching the county records.
A conclusion such as the plaintiffs and appellants seek
to reach would nullify the purpose of our recording statutes
in imparting constructive notice of the instrument filed
of record.
CONCLUSION
The District Court properly granted Defendants.' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Memorandum Decision
of Judge Harding in which he states : "There is no allegation or showing of any kind as to the cause of the failure
and whether the failure had any connection with the undisclosed indebtedness or chattel mortgage" is fully supported
by the record. It is also conclusively shown that as a matter
of law the cause of action alleged by plaintiffs is barred
by the Statute of Limitations. The summary judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
David E. Salisbury,

AttoTneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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